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ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS: STATE AND FEDERAL 
APPliCATIONS AND THEIR FUTURE IN MARYLAND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To combat the transportation of illegal drugs, many law en-
forcement agents rely on anticipatory search warrants. 1 Given the 
ease with which illegal drugs can be moved, waiting until they actu-
ally reach a location before obtaining a warrant may allow suspects 
to destroy or transfer the contraband before the warrant is exe-
cuted.2 The typical scenario for which law enforcement officials seek 
anticipatory warrants occurs when customs officials inspect interna-
tional packages coming into the United States. 3 When customs 
agents alert federal or local law enforcement authorities that a pack-
age contains illegal drugs, the police cooperate with postal service 
officials to determine the approximate time delivery of the contra-
band will be made.4 This information and any other relevant facts 
contributing to a probable cause determination is then set forth in 
an affidavit upon which a search warrant may be issued.s 
Anticipatory warrants are used to seize contraband delivered by 
one of three means: (1) a controlled delivery, where a police officer 
poses as a delivery person and transfers the contraband; (2) an ob-
served delivery, where customs officials intercept the contraband 
and notify the police who observe the contraband as it is delivered; 
and (3) an uncontrolled delivery where police receive a tip that 
contraband will be delivered, but are unaware as to who will be 
1. See, e.g., Sean R. O'Brien, United States v. Leon and the Freezing of the Fourth 
Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1305, 1334 (1993) (recognizing law enforce-
ment's increased reliance on anticipatory warrants corresponding "with the es-
calation of the government's so-called 'war on drugs' H); see also BlACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 93 (6th ed. 1990) (defining an anticipatory search warrant as "[a] 
warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future 
time, but not presently, certain evidence of crime will be located at specified 
place; such warrant is to be distinguished from a premature search"). 
2. See Alvidres v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 682, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) 
("The speed with which law enforcement is often required to act, especially 
when dealing with the furtive and transitory activities of persons who traffic in 
narcotics, demands that the courts make every effort to assist law enforcement 
in complying with the edicts that the courts themselves have issued."). 
3. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE. SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.7(c), at 362-63 (3d ed. 1996). 
4. See id. at 363. 
5. See id. 
337 
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making the delivery.6 
However, in none of these situations would a traditional search 
warrant uphold the subsequent search and seizure by law enforce-
ment. Based on probable cause that evidence of a crime will be at a 
specified location, the anticipatory search warrant is very different 
from a traditional search warrant.? Whereas anticipatory search war-
rants focus on the future, traditional search warrants are based on 
probable cause that evidence of a crime is presently at a specified 
loc,ation. R 
Some courts consider this distinction crucial, concluding that 
anticipatory warrants violate the Fourth Amendment9 or state stat-
utes lO and suppressing evidence gathered pursuant to them. II Like-
wise, defendants frequently challenge the evidence obtained pursu-
ant to an anticipatory search warrant on constitutional grounds. 12 
They argue that anticipatory search warrants are not issued on the 
belief that contraband is present at the specified location described 
in the affidavit. 13 Yet, a majority of courts conclude otherwise, per-
mitting the State to use evidence gathered from the execution of 
anticipatory search warrants in its case-in-chief.14 Although the Su-
6, See Robert A, Messina, Anticipatary Search Warrants: Striking a Balance Between Pri-
vacy Rights and Police Action, 22 S, ILL, U, LJ 391, 405 (1998). . 
7. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 362. 
8. See id. at 364. 
9. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. -
U.S. CONSI'. amend. IV. 
10. See infra Section III.B. 
11. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (requiring the suppression of evi-
dence g'athered in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
12. See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 364. 
13. See id. 
14. -See United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (uphold-
i~g the validity of an anticipatory warrant based on an affidavit indicating that 
a courier planned to deliver marijuana to a residence and that execution was 
contingent on delivery); United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1426 (7th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1169 (1997) (explaining that anticipatory search 
warrants are valid when they are based on probable cause that property will 
be located at a designated place at the time of the search); United States v. 
Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1137 (1997) (af-
tirming the validity of anticipatory warrants, even though the suspect left the 
premises with the package under surveillance prior to the execution of the 
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preme Court has not directly ruled on the issue, it would likely af-
firm the validity of anticipatory search warrants under the Fourth 
Amendment. 15 
In Maryland, the court of appeals has taken a stance seemingly 
out of tune with much of the country. In Kostelec v. State,16 the court 
narrowly interpreted the language of section 551 (a) of Article 27 of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland 17 and suppressed evidence gath-
ered pursuant to an anticipatory warrant. IS The court of appeals 
sent a message to the Maryland General Assembly that it must 
amend the law if anticipatory search warrants are to be valid under 
warrant); United States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing 
that an anticipatory warrant is valid when contraband in the mail is on an ir-
reversible course to a known destination); United States V. Gendron, 18 F.3d 
955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that anticipatory warrants are valid when a 
court found probable cause after the package in question was delivered by 
mail and taken to the defendant's residence); United States V. Bieri, 21 F.3d 
811, 814 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the validity of an anticipatory warrant 
when probable cause was based on an affidavit stating that a courier planned 
to deliver marijuana to a residence and the execution of the warrant was con-
tingent on the delivery); United States V. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985, 987 (6th Cir. 
1993) (affirming the constitutionality of an anticipatory warrant issued to 
search a package en route to a location where cocaine was present); United 
States V. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that an anticipatory 
warrant is valid when a magistrate reasonably concluded that the defendant's 
home was the final destination for contraband discovered in the mail); 
United States V. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining 
that an anticipatory warrant is valid when the contraband in question is on a 
course to a definite location) (citing United States V. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 
(4th Cir. 1988». 
15. See infra notes 290-99 and accompanying text. 
16. 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997). 
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1957 & Supp. 1996). The statute provides, in 
pertinent part: Whenever it be made to appear to any judge ... by written 
application signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompanied by an affida-
vit ... containing facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant ... that 
there is probable cause, the basis of which shall be set forth in said affida-
vit ... to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed by any in-
dividual or in any building ... or that any property subject to seizure under 
the criminal laws of the State is situated or located on the person of any such 
individual or in or on any such building ... then the judge may forthwith is-
sue a search warrant. . .. [d. (emphasis added). The Kostelec court inter-
preted the phrases "is being committed" and "is situated or located" Iiter-
a1ly--events giving rise to probable cause must be occurring as of the time 
when the affidavit for a search warrant is sworn. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 236, 
703 A.2d at 163. 
18. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 243, 703 A.2d at 166. 
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Maryland law. 19 If the Maryland General Assembly were to statutorily 
eliminate anticipatory search warrants, only constitutional grounds 
would remain for a defendant's challenge.2o 
This Comment examines the future of anticipatory search war-
rants on the state and federal level. In Part II, this Comment re-
views the federal courts' treatment of anticipatory searches, discuss-
ing why such warrants have been upheld and why some courts have 
decided to strike them down.21 In Part III, this Comment explores 
how various states h~ve dealt with anticipatory search warrants,22 In 
Part N, this Comment traces the evolution of Maryland's treatment 
of anticipatory search warrants, how Kostelec affected that evolution, 
and the state's future handling of the issue.23 In Part V, this Com-
ment analyzes the Supreme Court's handling of similar Fourth 
Amendment issues and forecasts its opinion on the constitutionality 
of anticipatory search warrants.24 In Part VI, this Comment exam-
ines why anticipatory search warrants are used and examines the de-
bate between those who support anticipatory search warrants and 
those who do not.25 Further, this Section focuses on the benefits 
and detriments of the use of anticipatory warrants by law enforce-
ment personnel,26 Finally, in Part VII, this Comment concludes that 
courts addressing the issue of anticipatory warrants must strike a 
delicate balance to account for the personal interests and rights 
guaranteed under Maryland and Federal Constitutional law. 
II. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS IN FEDERAL COURTS 
Prior to its change in 1990, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
41 (a) authorized the issuance of a search warrant by certain judicial 
officers "within the district wherein the property or person sought 
is located."27 In 1990, the words of limitation, "is located," were re-
19. The Kostelec court's remarks suggest that for anticipatory warrants to be up-
held in Maryland, section 551 must be amended to include the language "will 
be located." See id. at 236-37,703 A.2d at 163. 
20. See id. at 241, 703 A.2d at 165 .. 66 (recognizing that anticipatory warrants raise 
potential Fourth Amendment concerns). The court did not address the con .. 
stitutionality of anticipatory searches under the Fourth Amendment. See id. 
21. See supra notes 27 .. 130 and accompanying text. 
22. See supra notes 131 .. 211 and accompanying text. 
23. See supra notes 212-86 and accompanying text. 
24. See supra notes 287 .. 99 and accompanying text. 
25. See supra notes 30~21 and accompanying text. 
26. See supra notes 322 .. 32 and accompanying text. 
27. See FED. R CRIM. P. 41(a) (1989). 
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moved from the rule.28 Rule 41 (a)(l) now reads: "Upon the request 
of a federal law .enforcement officer or an attorney for the go~ern­
me nt, a search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued 
(I) . . . for a search of property or for a person within the dis-
trict. "29 The amendment of the rule removed the requirement that 
the items listed in an affidavit be at the specified location at the 
time the affidavit is sworn.30 This change effectively validated antici-
patory search warrants under the federal rules.31 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the is-
sue of anticipatory search warrants,32 it has laid out the standards 
on which probable cause for a search warrant is based.33 The Fourth 
Amendment provides that no warrants shall be issued, but upon 
probable cause.34 Therefore, a court may issue a warrant only if 
there is probable cause to believe that seizable evidence will be 
28. See id. 
29. fd. Additionally, the advisory committee notes to the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure provide: Rule 41(a)(I) pennits anticipatory warrants byomit-
ting the words "is located" which in the past required that in all instances the 
object of the search had to be located within the district at the time the war-
rant was issued. Now a search for property or a person within the district, or 
expected to be within the district, is valid if it otherwise complies with the 
rule. fd. (advisory committee note). 
30. See id. 
31. See Richard A. Powers, III, Anticipatory Search Warrants: FutUTr! Probabli! Cause, 28 
CRIM. L. BULL 59, 6().61 (1992) (discussing the effect of the 1990 amendments 
to Rule 41 on the validity of anticipatory warrants). 
32. While not ruling directly on the issue, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
in dicta that warrants can be anticipatory. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 
85, 102 (1979) (Rehnquist, j., dissenting) (noting that a warrant is by defini-
tion "an anticipatory authorization"); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 
n.19 (1979) (finding that officers are not required to set forth the anticipated 
means for execution); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 450 n.15 (1976) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that "a warrant based on anticipated 
facts is premature and void"). The Court has also implied the legality of antic-
ipatory warrants by upholding the validity of wiretapping to collect evidence 
for arrest. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-52 (1967); see also James A. 
Adams, Anticipatory Search Warrants: Constitutionality, Requirements, and Scope, 79 
KY. LJ. 681, 688-90 (1991) (discussing Supreme Court decisions that imply an-
ticipatory warrants are valid). 
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) 
(concluding that searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); CHARLES WHITEBREAD & 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CAsES AND CoN· 
CEPTS § 4.05 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the probable cause standard for 
searches and seizures). 
34. See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
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found on the premises or person to be searched.35 
While a majority of federal courts have held .that anticipatory 
search warrants are consistent with the Fourth Amendment,36 a few 
cases are commonly cited by defendants that challenge the validity 
of such warrants.37 In United States v. Travisano,38 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that government 
agents had sufficiently established probable cause by demonstrating 
that a crime had been committed and that stolen property was lo-
cated at the residence to be searched at the time of the warrant's is-
suance.39 In Travisano, Connecticut police were investigating a shoot-
ing and robbery.40 Within twenty-four hours of the crime, the police 
located a vehicle matching the description of the suspected getaway 
vehicle parked outside of a residence.41 Securing a search warrant 
for the residence and automobile, law enforcement officials could 
not locate the instrumentalities of the crime; however, officials did 
find an unregistered firearm in the house and subsequently sought 
an indictment.42 The court found sufficient probable cause to sup-
port the admission of the unregistered firearm, primarily relying on 
the location of the suspected getaway vehicle outside of the resi-
dence.43 Although the court found that probable cause existed, the 
court's language, "probable cause to believe that evidence of such 
35. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (observing that 
probable cause requires evidence that would warrant a reasonable person to 
believe a felony has been committed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
162 (1925) (explaining that officers had probable cause to conduct a search 
and seizure of an automobile because "the facts and circumstances within 
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information 
were sufficient" to justify a search). 
36. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983) (explain-
ing that probable cause to search a residence requires a belief that evidence 
of a crime is located at that residence); United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 
653, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) (observing that at the time officers conduct a search, 
facts should exist to justify that the object of the search is present); United 
States v. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 1964) (concluding that "a search 
warrant is based upon a judicial determination of the present existence of jus-
tifying grounds-i.e., at the time of the issuance of the warrant"). 
38. 724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1983). 
39. See id. at 345. 
40. See id. at 342-43. 
41. See id. at 342. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. at 34647. 
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crime is located,"44 is often cited to support the propositi(m that a 
warrant is only valid if the evidence in question is present at the 
specified location at the time the warrant is sworn.45 
In Unite4 States v. Rundle,46 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit concluded that probable cause had not been 
established by a showing that legal materials required to perform 
future illegal activities were at a specified location.47 Here, law en-
forcement officials conducted a warrant-based search of an illegal 
abortion clinic.48 The affidavit underlying the warrant stated that 
materials to perform abortions were located at the address.49 The 
court held that the possession of such materials alone-which by 
themselves were not illegal-was insufficient to create probable 
cause, because there was no demonstration that illegal behavior was 
presently occurring.50 The Rundle court observed: "A search warrant 
is based upon a judicial determination of the present existence of 
justifying grounds-Le., at the time of the issuance of the war-
rant."51 Therefore, the court concluded that the illegally seized 
materials should not have been used as evidence in the defendant's 
conviction. 52 
In United States v. Hendricks,53 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit likewise held that an anticipatory search 
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.54 In Hendricks, customs of-
ficials intercepted a package shipped from Brazil to Arizona.55 Un-
like other cases involving anticipatory warrants, the package was not 
mailed directly to the defendant's address. 56 The address on the 
package was for identification purposes only; the defendant had to 
44. [d. at 345 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584 
(1971» .. 
45. See Gendron v.United States, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (lst Cir. 1994). 
46. 327 F:2d 153 (3d Cir. 1964). 
47. See id. at 160. 
48. See id. at 155. 
49. See id. 
50. See id at 163. 
51. [d. (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 258 F.2d 435, 436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1958) 
(Bazelon, j., concurring». 
52. See id. at 165. However, the defendant's conviction was not overturned because 
he failed to: exhaust his State's available remedies before ptfisuing habeas 
corpus relief. See id. 
53. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984). 
54. See id. at 656. 
55. See id. at 653. 
56. See id. 
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personally pick up the package at the airport. 57 When inspected by 
customs officials, the package contained five to seven pounds of co-
caine. 58 Despite the fact that the package was not to be delivered to 
the defendant's home, Drug Enforcement Agency personnel ob-
tained a search warrant for his home.59 
The Hendricks court held that the search warrant based on the 
contents of a package did not establish sufficient probable cause to 
support the issuance of a warrant to search the defendant's home.60 
The court further concluded that the magistrate issuing the warrant 
could not have reasonably concluded that the defendant would pick 
up the box and take it to his residence.61 At the time the warrant 
was issued, the magistrate knew that the package was not at the 
defendant's home.62 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no showing of probable 
cause to support a conclusion that the package was at the listed ad-
dress at the time of the issuance of the warrant63 and that there was 
an insufficient nexus between the box and the residence.64 The 
court explained: "The facts must be sufficient to justify a conclu-
sion ... that the property which is the object of the search is prob-
ably on the person or premises to be searched at the time the war-
rant is issued. "65 
Therefore, according to the Travisano, Rundle, and Hendricks 
courts, the Fourth Amendment requires that probable cause exist at 
57. See id. 
58. See id. The court likened the officials' contact of the defendant to "a situation 
where police create the exigent circumstances and then use the existence of 
those exigencies to justify a search." Id. at 654 n.l (citing United States v. Al-
lard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980». 
59. See id. at 653-54. 
60. See id. at 655. The court observed that a telephonic warrant-issued as the 
events giving rise to probable cause occurred-was a preferable substitute for 
the anticipatory warrant. See id. at 655 n.2. 
61. See id. at 655. 
62. See id. at 654. 
63. See id. at 655. Although the court did recognize that other courts applied the 
"on a sure course" test, it concluded that no probable cause existed because 
Hendricks had not even attempted to pick up the box (which would not have 
been delivered to his address by the carrier) at the time of the warrant's issu-
ance. See id. 
64. See id. However, the court refused to apply the exclusionary rule because the 
officer's reliance was not unreasonable under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984). See id. at 656. For a discussion of Leon, see infra notes 263-64 and 
accqmpanying text. 
65. Id. (quoting Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190, 193 (9th Cir. 1968». 
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the time of the issuance of the warrant.66 Otherwise, the search is 
unreasonable and any evidence gathered will be suppressed at the 
subsequent trial.67 However, several other federal courts conclude 
differently by concentrating on whether sufficient information exists 
to support a warrant before the contraband or other evidence of a 
crime is at a particular location. 
A. The "On a Sure Course" Test 
Notwithstanding Travisano, Rundle, and Hendricks, federal courts 
often uphold anticipatory warrants that involve a controlled delivery 
of contraband that is "on a sure course to its destination" through 
the mail.68 In United States v. Dornhofer,69 the United States Court of 
66. Compare United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir. 1983) (conclud-
ing that agents had established probable cause prior to entering the defend-
ant's residence, and therefore refusing to suppress the evidence that was 
seized), with United States V. Rundle, 327 F.2d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1964) (sup-
pressing evidence seized from an abortion clinic where the officers who had 
obtained the warrant had no grounds to believe illegal contraband would be 
found), and Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 656 (invalidating a search warrant for a 
home that was not based on facts establishing probable cause that evidence of 
a crime would be on the premises at the time the warrant was issued). 
67. See Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
68. See United States V. Domhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying on 
the "sure course" of a package containing child pornography to uphold the 
validity of an anticipatory warrant contingent on law enforcement's mailing of 
the package to the original address); see also United States V. Becerra, 97 F.3d 
669, 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming the defendant's drug conviction based on 
evidence gathered during a search supported by an anticipatory warrant and 
executed via a controlled delivery) (citing United States V. Garcia, 882 F.2d 
699,702 (2d Cir. 1989»; United States V. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331, 333-34 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding that a postal inspector's controlled delivery of contraband 
videotape complied with the "on a sure course" test); United States V. Jack-
son, 55 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that probable cause to 
search for evidence of drug trafficking had been established when law en-
forcement officials conducted a controlled delivery of a package of heroin 
and the package was accepted, even though a suspect subsequently fled from 
the residence with the package); United States V. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965-67 
(1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a package containing a videotape of child por-
nography, which was delivered to the address on the package and taken into 
the residence, established probable cause that evidence of a crime would be 
located in the house); United States V. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 949-51 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (holding that a package of hashish and marijuana placed in the 
mail for controlled delivery to the address on the package, and received into 
the residence by the addressee, established probable cause); United States V. 
Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[C]ontraband does not have to 
be presently located at the place described in the warrant if there is probable 
346 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit conducted a representative analysis 
under this test. Here, law enforcement officials conducted a sting 
operation to detect buyers of child pornography.70 When the 
defendant accepted the sting operation's mailed offer, law enforce-
ment officials obtained an anticipatory warrant for his house, condi-
tioned on the placement of the materials in the mail.? 1 Observing 
the defendant retrieve the pornography from his mailbox and re-
turn to his residence, law enforcement officials conducted a search 
of the defendant's house.72 The court noted that an article must be 
"on a slire course" to its destination to create a constitutionally 
valid anticipatory search warrant.13 The court upheld the trial 
court's admission of the evidence gathered during the search be-
cause law enforcement officials fulfilled the condition in the war-
rant-the package was placed in the mail and delivered to the 
defendant.74 In making this conclusion, the court relied on the high 
level of certairity that an item will be delivered to the exact address 
provided to the postal service or a parcel post service.75 
In United States v. Gendron,76 the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
further refined the "on a sure course" test by discussing the particu-
larity of the "triggering event," or condition precedent to the exe-
cution of an anticipatory warrant.77 In Gendron, a man ordered child 
pornography from a company that, unbeknownst to him, was part 
of a government sting operation.78 Law enforcement agents sent the 
defendant the videotape that he had ordered and obtained a search 
warrant for his home to be executed on the tape's arrival.79 The 
videotape was delivered, the search was executed, and the tape was 
cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed."). 
69. 859 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1988). 
70. See itt. at 1197. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. at 1198. The court remarked that it had "adopted" the analysis of the 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468.{)9 (9th Cir. 1986). 
See id. However, the Hale court actually applied a very expansive version of 
this test. See infra notes. 105-13 and accompanying text. 
74. See Dornhofer, 859 F.2d at 1198. 
75. See id.; United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1195 (6th Cir. 1978). 
76. 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994). 
77. See id. at 967 (holding that a search warrant issued for a contraband videotape 
addressed to and received at the place to be searched is consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment). 
78. See id. at 957. 
79. See id. at 970. 
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seized as evidence.8o The defendant argued that the government's 
search warrant was defective because it did not adequately specify 
when the warrant would take effect.8) 
The court in Gendron concluded that the simple "fact that a 
warrant is 'anticipatory' ... does not invalidate a warrant or make it 
somehow suspect or legally disfavored. "82 The court also noted that 
the Constitution does not impose the requirement that warrants 
take effect upon issuance; rather the Constitution requires that they 
are not unreasonable and that they are supported by probable 
cause.83 The court further explained that there was nothing unrea-
sonable about authorizing a search for a future date when reliable 
information indicates that contraband will reach a specified location 
some time in the future. 84 
The Gendron court noted that in principle, the use of some 
"triggering event," contraband being delivered to a certain location 
to determine when a warrant will go into effect, can help assure 
that the search takes place only when justified by " 'probable 
cause.' ,"85 The court concluded that anticipatory warrants may thus 
increase, rather than decrease, the protection against unreasonable 
intrusioris into a citizen's privacy.86 
Several courts have also applied a loose interpretation of the 
"particularity requirement" of the Fourth Amendment87 for antici-
80. See id. 
81. See id. at 965. 
82. [d. 
83. See id. 
84. See id.; United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (con-
cluding that a warrant that will only become effective upon the happening of 
some future event is not unconstitutional per se). 
85. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965. 
86. See id.; see also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 3.7(c), at 97. Professor LaFave 
observed: 
[d. 
[A]s a general proposition the facts put forward to justify issuance of 
an anticipatory warrant are more likely to establish that probable 
cause will exist at the time of the search than the typical warrant 
based solely upon the known prior location of the items to be seized 
at the place to be searched. 
87. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (discussing the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement as a protection 
against "[a] general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings"); Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965) (discussing the particularity require-
ment as it relates to things to be seized by law enforcement officers and not-
ing that" [a]s to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the 
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patory warrants.88 In United States v. Dennis,89 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the sufficiency of the 
conditions precedent to the execution of an anticipatory warrant90 
and of the nexus between the package, defendants, and residence 
to be searched.91 Determining that a package matched a "drug 
package profile" and conducting a drug dog sniff, a postal inspector 
opened a package to discover that it contained cocaine.92 The postal 
inspector then sealed the package with an electronic beeper en-
closed in the package and sought an anticipatory warrant to search 
officer executing the warrant" (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 
196 (1927))); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886) (explaining 
that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment prevents govern-
ment officials from initiating broad, unfounded searches of citizens homes); 
see also Larry EchoHawk & Paul EchoHawk, Curing a Search Warrant that Fails 
to Particularly Describe the Place to be Searched, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (ex-
plaining that when assessing a particularity challenge "the ultimate inquiry is 
always whether the terms of the warrant limited the discretion of the officer 
executing the warrant"). 
88. See United States v. Hotal, 143 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) ("We conclude 
only that the necessary conditions [precedent] must appear in the court-
issued warrant and attachments that those executing the search maintain in 
their immediate possession in order to guide their actions and to provide in-
formation to the person whose property is being searched."); United States v. 
Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding the conditions precedent to 
execution of the anticipatory warrant had been adequately stated in the war-
rant's accompanying affidavit); Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085-86 (upholding the 
validity of an anticipatory warrant as the conditions precedent to its execution 
were adequately set forth· on the warrant's face). 
89. 115 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 1997). 
90. See id. at 528-29. 
91. See id. at 529-31. In its consideration of the nexus between the package, the 
defendants, and the residence to be searched, the court recognized the pres-
ence of at least two alternatives-the "on a sure course" test and the Garcia 
test-to establishing probable cause. See id. at 530. Although the court noted 
that several jurisdictions held that placing contraband in the mail to an ad-
dress satisfied the "on a sure course" test, see id. at 530 (citing United States v. 
Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 854 
F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (9th 
Cir. 1986)), it held that the Garcia test would also be satisfied. See id. at 530-31. 
For this conclusion, the court relied on the postal. inspector's experience in 
profiling, the excessive quantity of cocaine (which negated any possibility that 
the product was sent on a whim), and the defendant's connections to previ-
ous drug trafficking activities. See id. For a discussion of the Garcia test, see in-
fra notes 114-30 and accompanying text. 
92. See Dennis, 115 F.3d at 527. 
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the defendant's residence at the listed address.93 The sole condition 
precedent was established in the affidavit, not in the actual warrant 
underlying the search.94 
In his subsequent challenge to the evidence gathered during 
the controlled delivery, the defendant argued that the warrant was 
facially void because it failed to provide the conditions precedent to 
the search.95 Even though the affidavit was not attached to the war-
rant, the court nonetheless held that the affidavit sufficiently set 
forth the conditions precedent to the search.96 The court 
concluded: 
The face of the warrant stated that execution of the warrant 
was subject to the conditions stated in the affidavit. This evi-
dences that the issuing judge read and considered the affi-
davit in issuing the warrant. The record also establishes that 
the officers complied with the conditions precedent in exe-
cuting the warrant.97 
In United States v. Hugoboom,98 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit echoed the sentiments of the Dennis 
court by refusing to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a war-
rant that did not explicitly set forth all conditions precedent to the 
search.99 Much like in Dennis, the postal inspector involved in 
Hugoboom noticed that a package matched a drug profile and or-
dered a drug dog sniff.l00 Conducting a controlled delivery, law en-
forcement officials searched the house and arrested the defend-
93. See id. 
94. As issued by the magistrate and incorporated by the actual warrant, the affida-
vit requested permission to search each floor of the two-story residence only if 
an occupant of that floor opened the package. See id. at 528. Therefore, only 
if the resident of the first floor accepted or opened the package could law en-
forcement personnel search the first floor. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. at 529. In support, the Dennis court relied on United States v. Moetamedi, 
46 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 1995), where the court concluded: "[A] n anticipatory 
warrant need not state on its face the conditions precedent for its execution 
if the warrant affidavit contains 'clear, explicit, and narrowly drawn' condi-
tions and the executing officers actually satisry those conditions before execut-
ing the warrant." [d. (quoting Moetamedi, 46 F.3d at 229). 
97. [d. (footnote omitted). 
98. 112 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1997). 
99. See id. at 1085-86. 
100. See id. at 1083. 
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ant.101 In response to the defendant's argument that the warrant was 
defective because it did not specify the conditions precedent to the 
warrant, the court noted: 
Many, if not most, search warrants are effective upon issu-
ance and may be executed immediately thereafter. However, 
an anticipatory warrant .. .is not unconstitutional per se 
and is, indeed, no stranger to the law. Such warrants have 
repeatedly been upheld, assuming probable cause and so 
long as the conditions precedent to execution are clearly 
set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the 
anticipatory warrant.102 
Concluding that the package was "on a sure course" to the 
defendant's residence, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction 
and refused to overturn the lower court's denial of the motion to 
suppress. 103 
Although the "on a sure course" test has served as a starting 
point for determining the validity of anticipatory warrants, some 
federal circuits have loosely interpreted the test's parameters. 104 As 
demonstrated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in United States v. Hale,105 some federal courts have 
significantly relaxed the requirements of the test. In Hale, customs 
officials notified the defendant that a shipment of sexually explicit 
material had been intercepted and confiscated. I06 Hale chose not to 
respond to this notification and did not attempt to receive the ille-
gal material. 107 Customs inspectors then confiscated the remainder 
of Hale's order when it arrived in the country in four separate enve-
101. See id. at 1083-84. 
102. Id. at 1085 (emphasis added). 
103. See id. at 1087. 
104. See United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that 
the search of a residence pursuant to an anticipatory warrant was valid even 
though the contraband was removed from the address on which the warrant 
was based prior to the execution of the warrant); United States v. Gendron, 
18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding an anticipatory warrant to be valid 
even though the warrant did not state the exact time at which the controlled 
delivery of the package was to take place). 
105. 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Weber, 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990). 
106. See id. at 1467. The shipment was part of an order he had placed with a 
Netherlands distributor. See id. 
107. See id. 
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lopes. lOS Rather than notifying Hale of these actions, customs agents 
sought a warrant for Hale's residence based on their intention "to 
have the previously described envelopes delivered as addressed by 
an employee of the United States Postal Service."I09 A controlled de-
livery of the pornography was made to Hale's residence and he was 
subsequently arrested. 110 
Hale challenged the validity of the search warrant for his home 
on the grounds that it was anticipatory in nature. lll The court held 
that the "on a sure course" test had been satisfied because the con-
traband on which the warrant was based was originally addressed to 
Hale's residence for delivery)'2 Although the court reasoned that 
customs officials had not interfered with the destination of Hale's 
mail, customs officials did have control over whether or not the 
contraband was actually delivered. ll3 It is clear that customs agents 
initially intercepted Hale's pornographic material so that it would 
not be delivered, but subsequently had it delivered to justify a 
search of Hale's residence for other evidence of criminality. In do-
ing so, customs officials manipulated the delivery of contraband to 
serve their own purposes, thus distorting the underlying purposes of 
the "on a sure course" test. 
B. An Alternative Analysis-The Garcia Test 
However, not all federal courts have applied the "on a sure 
course" test when confronted with the constitutional validity of an-
ticipatory warrants. In United States v. Garcia,1l4 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an anticipatory 
search warrant, without determining whether the evidence was on a 
"sure course to a known destination.""5 Instead, the Garcia court fo-
cused on independent evidence demonstrating probable cause."6 
Although recognizing that other courts predicate anticipatory war-
rants on a search for contraband that "is on a sure course to its des-
108. See id. 
109. [d. 
110. See id. at 1468. 
11 1. See id. 
112. See id. at 1469. 
113. See id. at 1470. 
114. 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989). 
115. [d. at 703-04. In fact, the contraband was in two duffel bags which were being 
carried by drug couriers. See id. at 700·01. Mter customs agents discovered 
drugs in the bags, the couriers gave up the defendant and agreed to make a 
controlled delivery. See id. 
116. See id. at 703. 
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tination," the Garcia court listed criteria for determining whether an 
anticipatory warrant establishes probable cause in the place of the 
"on a sure course" test. ll7 In Garcia, United States servicemen sta-
tioned in Panama smuggled cocaine into the United States. liS Inter-
cepted by customs officials in Miami,119 the two servicemen were 
flown to New York, where they agreed to cooperate with law en-
forcement officials and complete the delivery of the cocaine to 
other members of the smuggling operation. 120 Police obtained an 
anticipatory warrant for the home to which the servicemen were to 
deliver the cocaine. 121 
Unlike the frequent scenarios in which anticipatory warrants 
are utilized, authorities did not mail the contraband; instead, they 
played a direct role in determining how and when the contraband 
reached the final destination, much like the scenario addressed by 
the Hale court.122 Furthermore, the court concluded that "delivery," 
as required by the anticipatory warrant, had been made at the time 
of the execution of the warrant, even though the package had not 
been received by the defendant. 123 The ability of law enforcement 
officials to direct the transportation of the contraband in Garcia is 
quite different than the usual scenarios where the "on a sure 
course" test is applied-controlled deliveries to a specific individual 
at a specific address. 124 
Rather than applying the "on a sure course" test, the Garcia 
court required magistrates to seek "independent evidence gIvmg 
rise to probable cause that the contraband will be located at the 
117. fd. at 702-04. 
118. See id. at 70(}'() 1. 
119. See id. at 700. 
120. See id. at 701. Participants in the smuggling scheme usually delivered the co-
caine to one of three other participants: Gabriel Grant, Celina Wilson-Grant, 
or Francisca Caballero. See id. at 700. 
121. See id. As a defendant, Wilson-Grant argued that the anticipatory warrant was 
executed . prematurely because the agents conducted the search before she 
took possession of the cocaine. See id. at 704. The court rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that the delivery occurred when the servicemen entered the 
apartment and placed the bags containing the cocaine on the floor. See id. 
122. See id. For a discussion of United States v. Hale, see supra notes 105-13 and ac-
companying text. 
123. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 701. The servicemen were allowed in the apartment by 
the husband of one of the defendants. See id. They waited 10 minutes for 
someone to take possession of the bag. See id. No one did, but the DEA 
agents entered, announced they had a search warrant, and searched the 
apartment. See id. 
124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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premises at the time of the search."125 Moreover, according to the 
Garcia court, the affidavit underlying a warrant "must show, not only 
that the [government] agent believes a delivery of contraband is go-
ing to occur, but also how [the agent] obtained this belief, how reli-
able his sources are, and what part government agents will play in 
the delivery."126 Furthermore, the court warned that when an antici-
patory warrant is issued, "the magistrate should protect against its 
premature execution by listing in the warrant conditions governing 
its execution which are explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn so as to 
avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents."127 
Applying this analytical framework, the Garcia court concluded 
that the anticipatory warrant was supported by probable cause. 128 
The court found that the delivery fulfilled the clear conditions pre-
cedent of the warrant because the warrant specifically hinged on de-
livery by one of the serviceman, rather than delivery to a specific in-
dividual, such as any of the defendants. 129 Unlike the relatively clear 
contours of the "on a sure course" test, the Garcia court applied a 
more amorphous, flexible standard-much like the current stan-
dard for probable cause as dictated in Illinois v. Gates. 130 
III. . ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS IN STATE COURTS 
A. Jurisdictions Supporting the Use of Anticipatory Search Warrants 
In line with the trend in the federal circuits, 131 several state 
courts have upheld the use of anticipatory search warrants. 132 For 
125. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. at 70~. 
128. See id. at 704. 
129. See id. 
130. 462 u.s. 213,230-31 (1983). 
131. See supra Part II. 
132. See Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1124-25 n.11 (Alaska 1980) (observing that 
the better practice for issuing an anticipatory warrant would be for a judge to 
"insert a direction in the search warrant making execution contingent on the 
happening of an event which evidences probable cause that the item to be 
seized is in the place to be searched"); State v. Cox, 522 P.2d 29, 34 (Ariz. 
1974) (analyzing the validity of an anticipatory warrant based on information 
that a car carrying marijuana would be entering the country); People v. 
Souza, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 269-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the valid-
ity of an anticipatory warrant that was based on an individual's expectation of 
meeting a party to conduct a drug transaction); Bernie v; State, 524 So. 2d 
988, 991 (Fla. ·1988) (concluding that information concerning the future 
transport of drugs can be used to obtain an anticipatory search warrant); 
State v. Baker, 453 S.E.2d 115, 117 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the notion 
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example, in Alvidres v. Superior Court,133 California addressed the is-
sue of anticipatory search warrants. Here, federal authorities inter-
that anticipatory search warrants arc not per se illegal); State v. Wright, 772 
P.2d 250, 256 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) ("Whcre there is no present possession 
the supporting evidence for the prospective warrant must be strong that the 
particular possession of particular property will occur and that the elements 
to bring about that possession are in process and will result in the possession 
at the time and place specified ... ") (quoting People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 
614,617 (1972»); People v. Favela, 681 N.E.2d 582, 584-85 (III. App. Ct. 1997) 
(discussing the amendment of a state statute to allow the issuance of anticipa-
tory search warrants), appeal denied, 689 N.E.2d 1142 (III. 1997); Russell v. 
State, 395 N.E.2d 791, 798-800 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (observing that a state 
statute did not prohibit the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause to 
believe evidence of a crime will be at a specific location at a future time); 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 424 N.E.2d 221, 224-25 (Mass. 1981) (noting that a 
state statute permitted the issuance of a search warrant based upon a showing 
that concealment or possession is probable at the time the warrant is to be 
executed); People v. Brake, 527 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) 
(" [W] hen the affidavit shows that an identified individual has received, or an-
ticipates receiving, specific contraband through the mail at a particular loca-
tion, there is probable cause to believe that other contraband or evidence of 
the crime will be found at that location."); State v. Stott, 503 N.W.2d 822, 829 
(Neb. 1993) (basing a search warrant on information regarding a future date 
on which the defendant would receive more marijuana); State v. Parent, 867 
P.2d 1143, 1145-46 (Nev. 1994) (discussing a search warrant based on informa-
tion that a future flight would enter the jurisdiction carrying cocaine); State v. 
Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1101 (N.H. 1995) (observing that anticipatory search 
warrants do not per se violate the Fourth Amendment); State v. Ulrich, 628 
A.2d 368, 371-72 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (upholding the validity of a 
warrant "to be executed only if and when the specifically described event 
which gives rise to probable cause actually occurs"); Glen, 282 N.E.2d at 617 
(explaining that a state law requirement that search warrants be executed 
"forthwith" did not bar the use of anticipatory warrants, noting that "the ulti-
mate answer to the problem is that as long as the evidence creates a substan-
tial probability that the scizable property will be on the premises when 
search~d, the warrant should be sustained"); State v. Wahl, 450 N.W.2d 710, 
715-16 (N.D. 1990) (discussing the trustworthiness of an affidavit detailing cir-
cumstances of a controlled buy of drugs); State v. Folk, 599 N.E.2d 334, 337-38 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that there is no probable cause defect "as 
long as the evidence creates substantial probability that the seizable property 
will be on the premises when searched" (quoting Glen, 282 N.E.2d at 617»; 
Commonwealth v. DiGiovanni, 630 A.2d 42, 46-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (hold-
ing that the facts established a reasonable basis to conclude that there was a 
fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraband would arrive on the 
premises prior to any search); see also Messina, supra note·6, at 396-97 (discuss-
ing the development of the law of anticipatory search warrants). 
133. 90 Cal. Rptr. 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
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cepted a package addressed to the defendant's residence. 134 Finding 
marijuana within the package, law enforcement officers obtained an 
anticipatory warrant for Alvidres's address based on the knowledge 
that the post office would deliver the package. 135 Upon delivery, the 
police executed the warrant and arrested Alvidres. 136 The defendant 
argued that the affidavit sworn for the search of his home was void 
because it clearly demonstrated that there was no basis on which 
the court could conclude that the contraband was presently on the 
premises. 137 
The court upheld the validity of anticipatory warrants, observ-
ing that the "entire thrust of the exclusionary rule and the cases 
which have applied it is to encourage the use of search warrants by 
law enforcement officials." 138 The court also emphasized that "[0] ne 
of the major difficulties which confronts law enforcement in the at-
tempt to comply with court-enunciated requirements for a 'reasona-
ble' search and seizure is the time that is consumed in obtaining 
warrants."139 Rather than striking the anticipatory warrants as viola-
tive of the Fourth Amendment, the court went so far as to "com-
mend the participants in this procedure for their thoroughness, im-
agination and scrupulous compliance with the law."I40 
In People v. Glen, 141 the Court of Appeals of New York issued a 
similarly positive endorsement of anticipatory warrants. 142 An affida-
vit supporting an anticipatory search warrant averred that a package 
containing narcotics consigned to the defendant, a known drug 
dealer, was due to arrive at a local bus station}43 Mter the arrival of 
134. See id. at 683. 
135. See id. at 684. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. Id. at 685. The court noted that the time frame between the issuance of the 
warrant and its execution was so narrow that the court could evade the issue 
of anticipatory warrants altogether. See id. at 684. The court concluded that 
the warrant was valid regardless of whether it was issued before the drugs 
reached the residence or after they had reached the residence. See id. 
139. Id. at 685. 
140. Id. at 687. 
141. 282 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 1972). 
142. See id. at 617 (describing police use of anticipatory warrants as "laudable"). 
143. See id. at 616. The Glen court actually considered two, unrelated convictions 
on the appeal. See id. at 615. Although only the facts underlying the convic-
tion of J. Christopher Glen are discussed here, those underlying the convic-
tion of the other defendant are somewhat similar. See id. at 615-16. 
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the package, the police examined its contents. l44 Observing that the 
package contained marijuana, the police placed it under surveil-
lance. 145 On the following afternoon, Glen arrived at the bus station, 
picked up the package, and was subsequently arrested. 146 
The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant on 
the grounds that "a necessary condition precedent to the issuance 
of a search warrant is the present unlawful possession of seizable 
property on the person or at the place designated in the war-
rant. "147 The court not only upheld the validity of the search war-
rant, but further concluded that anticipatory warrants may be more 
reliable than traditional warrants because they predict where contra-
band will be at a given time. l48 
The Supreme Court of Alaska also upheld a conviction based 
on evidence gathered pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant is-
sued in Johnson v. State. 149 Here, an informant notified the police 
that a shipment of drugs was to be delivered to a local airport and 
then transported to the defendant's home. 150 An anticipatory search 
warrant was issued and two police officers were dispatched to the 
airport to observe the delivery of the package. lSI Observing two indi-
viduals accept the package, the officers followed them to the 
defendant's home and subsequently executed the search warrant 
obtained in anticipation of the package's delivery.152 During an in-
144. See id. at 616. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. [d. 
148. See id. at 617. The court reasoned: 
At best, present possession is only probative of the likelihood of fu-
ture possession. In cases [involving anticipatory search warrants] the 
certainty of future possession is greater or is often greater than that 
based on information of past and presumably current posses-
sion .... [I]n many kinds of organized crime the evidence supplied 
to obtain warrants does not relate to current crimes but past crimes 
with circumstances showing the likelihood of continuance of the 
same activity. In the present cases, the evidence that there would be a 
consummated prospective crime was logically and probatively 
stronger. The necessary pieces were in motion and all but inevitably 
the pieces would fall into a set, at a later time, constituting the 
crime. 
[d. at 617-18. 
149. 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980). 
150. See id. at 1120. 
151. See id. at 1122. 
152. See id. 
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spection of the package and the defendant's home, the police 
found a large quantity of cocaine and heroin. 153 
The defendant challenged the validity of the search warrant 
based on the inability of an affiant to positively identify the location 
of the contraband for an anticipatory search warrant. 154 The court 
rejected this argument, explaining that anticipatory warrants based 
on probable cause are "constitutionally permissible 'as long as the 
evidence creates a substantial probability that the seizable property 
will be on the premises when searched.' "155 
In Commonwealth v. Soares,156 the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Massachusetts also affirmed the conviction of a defendant based on 
evidence garnered pursuant to an anticipatory warrant. 15? A Califor-
nia parcel service clerk became suspicious of a customer's behavior 
when he dropped off a package. 15S Based on her authority and UPS 
regulations, the clerk checked the contents of the package and dis-
covered that it contained a cellophane bag of white powder. 159 The 
employee notified her supervisor who, in tum, contacted California 
state police to take control of the package. l60 A California detective 
determined that the powdery substance was methamphetamine. 161 
California law enforcement officials contacted the Massachusetts 
state police and informed them of the package's contents and the 
specific delivery address. 162 The narcotics were then repackaged and 
delivered to Massachusetts. 163 The Massachusetts state police ob-
tained an anticipatory search warrant for the address listed on the 
package and on delivery of the package, executed the warrant. l64 
The defendant sought to suppress all evidence recovered from 
the home on the grounds that the anticipatory search warrant was 
153. See id. 
154. See id. at 1125. 
155. Id. (quoting People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (N.Y 1972». The court also 
noted that anticipatory search warrants complied with a state statute that only 
required a reasonable belief that evidence will be located at a stated place at 
the time of execution of the warrant. See id. at 1124 (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 
12.35.020(3) (Michie 1990». 
156. 424 N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1981). 
157. See id. at 225. 
158. See id. at 223. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
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based on evidence that was not on the premises at the time of the 
warrant's issuance. 165 Therefore, the defendant argued, the warrant 
violated state law. 166 The court rejected the defendant's literal read-
ing of the statute and explained that the essential question under 
the state statute, as under the Fourth Amendment, is "whether 'the 
evidence [stated in the affidavit] creates substantial probability that 
the seizable property will be on the premises when searched.' "167 
The court observed that the defendant's narrow interpretation 
would not effectuate the purposes underlying the use of anticipa-
tory warrants, all of which were consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment and the state statute. 168 
B. Jurisdictions Suppressing Evidence Gathered Pursuant to Anticipatory 
Search Warrants 
Not all courts interpreting state statutes resembling the Fourth 
Amendment have concluded that anticipatory warrants are consis-
tent with state law. 169 While several states have upheld the validity of 
anticipatory search warrants,170 a few states have prohibited their 
165. See id. at 224 (discussing MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 1 (West 1980». The 
court describes the statute as providing that "warrants may [be] issue[d] in 
criminal cases on a showing of probable cause to believe that defined prop-
erty or articles, including 'property or articles the possession or control of 
which is unlawful, are concealed' in the place to be searched." [d. at 225. 
166. See id. 
167. Id. (quoting People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (N.Y. 1972». 
168. See id. at 224-25. For a discussion of the public policy initiatives underlying the 
use of anticipatory warrants, see infra Section VI.A. 
169. This is because of the federal structure of the American system of govern-
ment. A citizen's first line of protection is found in the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see 
supra note 9. A second line of protection for citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures resides in the case law interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (concluding that 
searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights must be suppressed from the government's case-in-chief). In ad-
dition to the United States Constitution and its case law, citizens enjoy the ad-
ditional protection of their respective state statutes that address search and 
seizure issues and probable cause requirements. See infra notes 176-211 and ac-
companying text. While states must at a minimum comply with the standards 
set forth in the United States Constitution, they are free to require even more 
stringent probable cause requirements for legal searches and seizures. See dis-
cussion infra Pa~ IV.A., V. 
170. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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use. 171 In most cases, these states have done so because language in 
their statutes prohibit the issuance of anticipatory warrants. 172 For 
example, in Ex Parte Oswalt,173 the Supreme Court of Alabama held 
that anticipatory search warrants were inconsistent with the Alabama 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 174 In Ex Parte Oswalt, a police officer 
obtained an anticipatory warrant for the defendant's home based 
on the knowledge that an undercover policeman would sell drugs 
to Oswalt at that 10cation.175 
. The court in Ex Parte Oswalt considered the language of Rule 
3.8 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, which uses both 
present and past tense in authorizing search warrants. 176 The court 
determined that the phrases "[ w] as unlawfully obtained, . . . [w] as 
used as the means of committing any offense, ... is in the posses-
sion of any person, [and] constitutes evidence of a criminal of-
fense" required that there be probable cause to believe that the co-
caine was located at Oswalt's premises at the time of the warrant's 
issuance.177 The court also relied on a statute predating the rule 
that required the evidence to be presently in the possession of the 
171. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
172. See Ex Parte Oswalt, 686 So. 2d 368, 373 (Ala. 1996) (construing an Alabama 
Rule of Criminal Procedure which, based on a predecessor statute, authorized 
search warrants if contraband was in the possession of the person or place to 
be searched); People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Colo. 1995) (construing 
a Colorado statute to imply that contraband must be at or on the location to 
be searched before a warrant is issued); Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 992 
(Fla. 1988) (per curiam) (concluding that an amendment to the state consti-
tution lifted the ban on anticipatory search warrants); People v. Ross, 659 
N.E.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Ill. 1991) (finding that a state statute required present 
probable cause that a crime had been committed and further commenting 
that the legislature should determine whether the use of anticipatory warrants 
should be allowed); State v. Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1995) (con-
struing a state statute to require that probable cause exist when a warrant is 
issued, not at some future time); KosteJec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 236-37, 703 
A.2d 160, 163 (1997) (holding that anticipatory search warrants are inconsis-
tent with a state statute governing probable cause for the issuance of a war-
rant). 
173. 686 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1996). 
174. See id. at 372-73. While the State focused on whether anticipatory warrants are 
per se unconstitutional, the court's analysis centered on whether "the specific 
anticipatory search warrant in this case was authorized by Rule 3.8." [d. The 
court conceded that anticipatory warrants are not per se unconstitutional. See 
id. 
175. See id. at 370. 
176. See id. at 373. 
177. [d. at 373-74. 
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person whose premises are to be searched. 178 As a result of the 
court's literal interpretation of the statute, the anticipatory search 
warrant for Oswalt's residence was held to be void. 179 
In People v. Poirez,180 a Colorado court similarly interpreted a 
state statute l81 to prohibit the use of anticipatory search warrants. 182 
Here, the police obtained a search warrant for the defendant's 
home because a package containing marijuana was to be deliv-
ered. 183 When the marijuana was delivered, police executed the war-
rant and arrested the defendant, Anthony Poirez, even though the 
package was addressed to Brett Johnson. 184 
Like Ex Parte Oswalt,185 the Poirez court held that anticipatory 
search warrants were inconsistent with the state's search and seizure 
statute. 186 The court observed that the language of the statute "cre-
ates a barrier to the issuance of anticipatory warrants by judicial of-
ficers."187 Like the Alabama provision involved in Ex Parte Oswalt, 
the state statute required that the object of the search be present at 
the designated location at the time the warrant was issued. 188 Moreo-
ver, the Colorado statute retained the language of the pre-1990 Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (a) that prohibited anticipatory 
warrants. 189 The court noted that it was the 1990 amendment to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (a) that allowed anticipatory 
warrants. l90 Therefore, because the state legislature had retained the 
178. See id. at 373. The court explained that the legislature had expressed no inten-
tion "to allow the issuance of a search warrant where, as in this case, the 
crime to which the evidence at issue relates has not yet occurred and the evi-
dence to be seized is not presently in the possession of the person whose 
premises are to be searched. ~ Id. 
179. See id. at 374. 
180. 904 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1995). 
181. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-303(1)(d) (West 1986) (requiring the affidavit 
to "establish probable cause to believe that the property to be search[ed] for, 
seized, or inspected is located at, in or upon the premises, person, place, or 
thing to be searched"). 
182. See Poirez., 904 P.2d at 880-81. 
183. See id. at 882. 
184. See id. 
185. For a discussion of Ex Parte Oswalt, see supra notes 173-79 and accompanying 
text. 
186. See Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883. 
187. Id. 
188. See id. at 882-83. 
189. See id. at 883. 
190. See id. For this conclusion, the court looked to the advisory committee note 
accompanying Rule 41(a). For the pertinent portion of this advisory commit-
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language of the pre-1990 rule, the court concluded that the statute 
continued to prohibit anticipatory warrants. 191 
The Supreme Court of Iowa also determined that anticipatory 
search warrants were inconsistent with its state search warrant au-
thorization statute in State v. Gillespie. 192 Here, state officials arrested 
an individual who delivered cocaine to a confidential informant. 193 
The individual agreed to cooperate with police and lead them to 
his supplier, Gillespie. 194 The state police obtained a search warrant 
for the defendant's home, conditioned on the informant's comple-
tion of a controlled drug buy from Gillespie and a field test of the 
substance bought. 195 These events transpired and the warrant was 
executed. 196 
Iowa Code sections 808.3 and 808.4 require a sworn application 
for a search warrant to include "facts, information, and circum-
stances tending to establish sufficient grounds for granting the ap-
plication, and probable cause for believing that the grounds ex-
ist ... [and] upon a finding of probable cause for grounds to issue 
a search warrant, the magistrate shall issue a warrant. "197 The court 
concluded that "the plain meaning of these statutes is that probable 
cause must exist at the time the warrant is issued and not at some 
future time when the warrant is executed."198 The court relied on 
language in each statute that required probable cause to exist as of 
the exact moment when the warrant was issued. 199 Although the 
lower court had found ambiguity in the statute and interpreted it 
against the defendant, the appellate court failed to find the statute 
unclear and reversed the defendant's conviction.2oo 
However, state statutes are becoming more and more receptive 
of anticipatory warrants, as evidenced by the analysis of the Su-
tee note, see supra note 29. 
191. See Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883. 
192. 530 N.W.2d 446 (Iowa 1995). 
193. See id. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. See id. 
197. Id. at 448 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 808.3-808.4 (West 1994». 
198. Id. 
199. See id. The court noted the dictionary definition of words in the statute-"cir-
cumstance," "fact," and "information" -referred to the past or present only. 
See id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICDONARY 113. 220. 311 (2d. ed. 1987». 
From this, the court concluded that the statutes "do not contemplate future 
acts or events as constituting probable cause." Id. 
200. See id. at 449-50. 
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preme Court of Florida in Bernie v. State. 201 The court held that an 
amendment of the Florida Constitution .relating to search and 
seizures brought Florida law into conformity with the federal case 
law finding anticipatory search warrants constitutionap02 In Bernie, 
the police obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the defend-
ant's home after officials discovered cocaine in a package addressed 
to him.203 The police executed the warrant after the controlled de-
livery and searched the defendant's home.204 
The defendant contended that the search of his home was inva-
lid under both Florida statutory205 and common law.206 The court 
held that a 1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution allowed 
the use of anticipatory search warrants.207 Mirroring the Fourth 
Amendment, the amendment to the state constitution opened the 
doors for anticipatory warrants.20S Likewise, the court interpreted 
the statutory law so as to permit anticipatory warrants, reasoning 
that the statute: 
allows a warrant to be issued when the evidence and sup-
porting affidavit show that the drugs have already been dis-
covered through a legal search and seizure and are pres-
ently in the process of being transported to the designated 
201. 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam). 
202. See id. at 989. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. at 989-90 (citing FlA. STAT. ANN. § 938.18 (West 1996) (prohibiting issu-
ance of warrants when "[t]he law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is being 
violated therein"». 
206. See id. (citing Gerardi v. State, 307 So. 2d 853, 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
1975» (holding that state statutory law forbids the issuance of search warrants 
unless a law is being currently violated at that location). 
207. See id. at 990-91. Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, relating to 
search and seizure, as amended in 1982 and effective January 3, 1983, 
provided: 
No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, 
the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communica-
tion to be intercepted, and the nature of the evidence to be ob-
tained. This right shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 990 (quoting FIA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 12 (1982». It should be noted that the amended statute makes no 
requirement that these things be located at the place to be searched 
when the affidavit is actually sworn. 
208. See id. 
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residence which is being used as the drug drop. It is our 
view that this is not the type of future allegation for a war-
rant that the legislature intended to prohibit by this 
statute. 209 
363 
Like Florida, other states have also recently proposed legisla-
tion to amend their search warrant statutes to allow anticipatory 
search warrants. For example, Colorado and Alabama have success-
fully amended their statutes to allow such warrants,210 while Rhode 
Island and Hawaii have proposed legislation to change their respec-
tive state laws.2Il 
IV. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS IN MARYLAND 
A. Historical Perspective 
Until 1997, Maryland courts had not addressed the issue of an-
ticipatory search warrants. In prior cases where anticipatory search 
warrants were at issue, the Court of Appeals of Maryland based its 
holdings on alternative grounds.212 In addition to the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution,213 Maryland citizens 
are protected against unreasonable search and seizures by Article 26 
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.214 Except in certain cases, a 
search of private property without consent is unreasonable unless it 
209. [d. at 992. 
210. See ALA. R CRIM. P. 3.7-3.8. In 1997, the Alabama Senate introduced Bill No. 
150 to revise the related statute. 
211. In 1997, the Hawaii Senate introduced Bill No. 2710 to amend the law for an-
ticipatory search warrants. Further, Rhode Island Senate Bill No. 2844 pro-
posed the amendment of the existing warrant statute to allow for anticipatory 
warrants. 
212. See infra notes 21845 and accompanying text. 
213. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (making the Fourth Amendment appli-
cable to the states). For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 9. 
214. See MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 26 ("[AlII warrants, without oath or affir-
mation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are 
grievious and oppressive."). Article 26 is construed to be in pari materia with 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Gadson v. State, 
341 Md. 1, 8 n.3, 668 A.2d 22, 26 n.3 (1995); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 492, 
124 A.2d 764, 768 (1956). In addition to the Maryland Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment, the Maryland General Assembly passed a statute which 
further protects citizens by laying out clear procedural requirements for the 
issuance of a valid search warrant. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1999) 
(providing that "any such search warrant shall name or describe, with reason-
able particularity, the individual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing 
to be searched, the grounds for the search warrant and the name of the ap-
plicant on whose written application as aforesaid the warrant was issued"). 
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has been authorized by a valid search warrant.215 
Additionally, section 551 (a) of Article 27 protects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.216 Section 551 (a) is not a mere reiter-
ation of the Maryland or United States Constitutions; it provides 
substantive and procedural requirements for a valid warrant.217 How-
ever, it is often applied in addition to these constitutional protec-
tions. In Salmon v. State/Is the court of special appeals applied sec-
tion 551 (a) to uphold the search of an individual who entered a 
building as a warrant was being executed.219 Salmon involved the 
search of a laundromat for evidence of illegal gambling.220 Execut-
ing a warrant, the police discovered illegal lottery tickets and other 
incriminating evidence.221 During the search, Salmon returned to 
215. See Peterson v. State, 281 Md. 309, 319, 379 A.2d 164, 169 (1977) ("[W]hether 
a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case."). 
216. For the text of Article 27, Section 551(a), see infra note 254. 
217. See In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 160, 458 A.2d 820, 
826 (1983). The court of special appeals provided the following nine require-
ments for a valid warrant: 
(1) that it be issued by a judge; (2) that the application be in writ-
ing; (3) that it be signed by the applicant; (4) that it be sworn by the 
applicant; (5) that it be accompanied by an affidavit containing ... 
facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant; (6) that there is 
probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed or that 
property subject to a seizure is located on a person or in a place; (7) 
that the individual or place to be searched be within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the judge; (8) that the warrant be issued to a duly 
constituted policeman; and (9) that the warrant name or describe 
with reasonable particularity, the individual, building, apartment, 
premises, place or thing to be searched. 
Id. at 168, 458 A.2d at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted). A failure of 
any of the nine requirements would render the warrant unlawful, and a fail-
ure of numbers 1, 4, 6, or 9 (or, arguably 7) would render the warrant uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 169, 458 A.2d at 830. 
218. 2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967). 
219. See id. at 519, 235 A.2d at 761; see also State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 
132, 138,486 A.2d 174, 177 (1985). The Intercontinental Limited court observed: 
To justify the issuance of such a warrant, the statute [551 (a)] appears 
to require that probable cause first be shown that "any misdemeanor 
or felony" is being committed; ... and that in connection therewith 
"property" subject or liable to seizure "under the criminal laws of 
this State" is located upon the individual or at the place or thing to 
be searched. 
Id. at 138, 486 A.2d at 177. 
220. See Salmon, 2 Md. App. at 516, 235 A.2d at 759. 
221. See id. at 516, 235 A.2d at 759-60. 
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the premises, indicating that she was the owner.222 Mter the officers 
identified themselves, the defendant left the premises.223 Police 
stopped her outside the laundromat and secured evidence of illegal 
gambling on her person.224 Although the court held that there must 
be probable cause that a crime has been committed, the court 
found that the search of the defendant was valid due in part to her 
flight from the premises after she was shown the search warrant.225 
Several decisions following Salmon have interpreted section 551 (a) 
to require that items of interest in a search warrant must be on the 
person or premises at the time the affidavit is swom.226 
In Cable v. State,227 the court of special appeals intimated its 
stance on the validity of anticipatory warrants.228 In Cable, police of-
ficers received information that a woman would be arriving at the 
airport carrying percodan and dilaudid intended for sale in Balti-
222. See id. 
223. See id. 
224. See id. at 516-17,235 A.2d at 759-60. 
225. See id. at 522-23, 235 A.2d at 763. 
226. See Wiebking v. State, 19 Md. App. 226, 237, 310 A.2d 577, 584 (1973) (finding 
a warrant invalid because the police did not have facts that gave probable 
cause to believe a crime was being .committed or that evidence was in the ve-
hicle); German v. State, 14 Md. App. 120, 126,286 A.2d 171, 174 (1972) (not-
ing that a warrant may be issued if a prudent and cautious man would be jus-
tified in believing that the offense had been or was being committed); 
Buckner v. State, 11 Md. App. 55, 60-61, 272 A.2d 828, 832 (1971) (observing 
that a judge may issue a warrant when there is probable cause to believe that 
a crime is being committed and that evidence of the crime is on the person 
or at the place to be searched); Iannone v. State, 10 Md. App. 81, 87-88, 267 
A.2d 812, 816 (1970) (explaining that because a warrant is for particular per-
sons and premises, it does not authorize a search of all persons in the build-
ing); Grimm v. State, 6 Md. App. 321, 326-27, 251 A.2d 230, 233-34 (1968) 
(finding that the allegations in the warrant application must show that an of-
fense had been or was being committed); Hall v. State, 5 Md. App. 394, 396-
97, 247 A.2d 548, 549-50 (1968) (providing that probable cause must be 
proven by the facts in the affidavit showing that a crime has been commit-
ted); Kist v. State, 4 Md. App. 282, 284-85, 242 A.2d 586, 587 (1968) (reiterat-
ing that probable cause evidence must be confined solely to the affidavit); 
Frey v. State, 3 Md. App. 38, 44, 237 A.2d 774, 778 (1968) (requiring the judge 
to be informed of the underlying circumstances in order to particularize the 
warrant); Scott v. State, 4 Md. App. 482, 488-89, 243 A.2d 609, 613-14 (1967) 
(stating that probable cause requires a proper showing that a crime is being 
committed or evidence is on the person). 
227. 65 Md. App. 493, 501 A.2d 108 (1985). 
228. See id. at 494, 501 A.2d at 109. 
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more.229 The officers received an anticipatory warrant to search the 
defendant's bags and belongings when she arrived at the airport.23o 
Upon arrival, the defendant was followed by police to a hotel and 
was arrested.231 A search of the bags revealed a claim ticket for a 
briefcase being held in a security room at the hotel.232 Without ob-
taining a search warrant, the police seized the briefcase that con-
tained the drugs. 233 The defendant challenged the seizure of the 
drugs, arguing that the search warrant was invalid because it was an-
ticipatory in nature.234 
Although the defendant argued that section 551 of Article 27 
prohibited the use of anticipatory warrants, the court concluded 
that this interpretation was "too restrictive a reading of the stat-
ute."235 Rather than addressing the issue of anticipatory warrants, 
the court concentrated on the control exercised by the defendant 
over the briefcase.236 The court characterized the defendant's pos-
session of the briefcase as "constructive"-even though the defend-
ant was not actually carrying the briefcase at the time of the arrest, 
the police could search it in the room because she possessed a 
claim check for the briefcase and the warrant expressly included 
the briefcase.237 The Cable court also reasoned that even if the war-
rant was defective, it fulfilled the good faith requirement estab-
lished in United States v. Leon,238 thereby causing the exclusionary 
rule not to apply.239 However, the court of special appeals was not 
the only Maryland court to decide the issue of anticipatory warrants 
on alternative grounds. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. at 495, 501 A.2d at 109. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. at 497, 501 A.2d at 110-11. The defendant argued that at the time the 
search warrant was issued, she had not yet committed a crime in Baltimore 
City, but that the police had based the warrant on the anticipation that drugs 
would be moved to the city. See id. 
235. [d. at 497,501 A.2d at 111. 
236. See id. at 495-97,501 A.2d at 109-11. 
237. See id. 
238. 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence 
obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued 
by a neutral and detached magistrate, even if the warrant was subsequently 
found to be invalid). 
239. See Cabk, 65 Md. App. at 498, 501 A.2d at 111. For a discussion of the exclu-
sionary rule, see infra notes 261-76 and accompanying text. 
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In State v. Lee,24O the court of appeals narrowly avoided the issue 
of anticipatory search warrants. Based on information provided by a 
confidential informant, the police obtained a search warrant condi-
tioned on the purchase of LSD by the informant's brother.241 The 
court avoided the anticipatory search warrant issue by determining 
that the informant's information failed to establish probable cause 
under Illinois v. Gates.242 Consequently, the search warrant was inva-
lid whether or not it was anticipatory.243 Although the court ac-
knowledged that "a number of appellate courts have addressed the 
constitutionality of anticipatory warrants, "244 it refused to decide the 
case on these grounds because the record did not "compel a consti-
tutional review of anticipatory search warrants, which must await a 
future case. "245 
B. Maryland's Current Approach to Anticipatory Warrants 
In 1997, the Court of Appeals of Maryland confronted that "fu-
ture case" in Kostelec v. State.246 Kostelec presented the common antic-
ipatory warrant scenario, where police intercepted a package con-
taining PCP mailed to a defendant.247 Law enforcement personnel 
made a controlled delivery to Lucabaugh's address and arrested 
him shortly after he left his home with the package.248 Lucabaugh 
then informed the police that the package was to be delivered to 
Roarke Boulton.249 The police determined that Boulton actually 
240. 330 Md. 320, 624 A.2d 492 (1993). 
241. See id. at 323-25, 624 A.2d at 493-94. 
242. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that the reliability of infonnation is to be 
judged under the totality of the circumstances, including considerations of 
the veracity and basis of knowledge of the infonnant). Gates replaced the for-
mer two-pronged test found in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. Refusing 
to uphold the defendant's conviction, the Lee court observed that the infor-
mation underlying the warrant provided no indication as to the veracity of 
the infonnant or the basis of his knowledge. See Lee, 330 Md. at 326-27, 624 
A.2d at 495. 
243. See Lee, 330 Md. at 326-27, 646 A.2d at 495. Notably, the State did not raise the 
Leon good faith exception to the exclUSionary rule. See id. at 327 n.l, 624 A.2d 
at 495 n.l. 
244. [d. at 328, 646 A.2d at 496. 
245. [d. at 329, 646 A.2d at 496. 
246. 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997). 
247. See id. at 232-33, 703 A.2d at 161. 
248. See id. at 233, 703 A.2d at 161. 
249. See id. 
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lived with the defendant, Kostelec.250 An anticipatory search warrant 
was then obtained for the defendant's address to be executed after 
police delivered the package.251 The package was delivered and ac-
cepted by the defendant.252 Subsequently, the warrant was executed 
and the defendant was arrested.253 
Kostelec moved to suppress the evidence gathered at his home, 
arguing that the search warrant did not comply with the narrowly 
drawn section 551254 and that anticipatory search warrants had never 
been validated by the Maryland legislature.255 The court of appeals 
granted certiorari solely on the question of whether an anticipatory 
search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit lacking probable 
cause that a crime was being committed at the time of the issuance 
was in compliance with Article 27, section 551(a).256 The court of 
appeals interpreted the present tense verbs of section 551 (a) to re-
quire probable cause to exist at the time the affidavit is sworn for a 
warrant.257 The court literally interpreted the statute, requiring the 
250. See id. 
251. See id. at 233-34, 703 A.2d at 161. 
252. See id. at 234, 703 A.2d at 162. 
253. See id. 
254. Article 27, section 551 (a) provides: 
Whenever it be made to appear to any judge . . . by written applica-
tion signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompanied by an affida-
vit . . . containing facts within the personal knowledge of the affi-
ant . . . that there is probable cause, the basis of which shall be set 
forth in said affidavit ... to believe that any misdemeanor or felony 
is being committed by any individual or in any building ... or that 
any property subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is 
situated or located on the person of any such individual or in or on 
any such building . . . then the judge may forthwith issue a search 
warrant. 
[d. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1997». 
255. See id. at 234-35, 703 A.2d at 162. 
256. See id. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163. On direct appeal, the court of special appeals 
affirmed the trial court's decision and rejected Kostelec's argument that antic-
ipatory search warrants did not comply with the language found in section 
551(a) of Article 27. See Kostelec v. State, 112 Md. App. 656, 670-71, 685 A.2d 
1222, 1229-30 (1996) (finding the language of the Maryland statute "at best 
ambiguous"), rev'd, 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997). The court of special ap-
peals held that section 551 (a) was in pari materia with the Fourth Amend-
ment which has been held to permit anticipatory search warrants. See id. at 
669-70,685 A.2d at 1229. The court noted that it should not decide a constitu-
tional issue unless the record compels such a determination, and the court 
rested on the construction of section 551 (a) only. See id. 
257. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163. 
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crime underlying the probable cause is currently "being commit-
ted," and that the property "is situated or located" on the described 
premises at the time the magistrate is asked to issue the search war~ 
rant.258 The court concluded that "[ t] he incompatibility of the lan-
guage of section 551 (a) with anticipatory warrants is explained by 
the fact that the language under consideration formed part of the 
statute's original enactment by Chapter 749 of the Acts of 1939, 
[which was] long before anticipatory warrants came into use."259 
The court held that anticipatory search warrants are not authorized 
in Maryland and reversed the decision of the court of special 
appea1s.260 
1. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Nexus with Article 27, Section 551 
Once the Kostelec court found anticipatory warrants inconsistent 
with section 551, the next natural question for the court was the ap-
propriate remedy. For constitutional violations, courts apply the ex-
clusionary rule-a court-created remedy suppressing evidence ob-
tained in violation of a defendant's rights from use in the 
government's case-in-chief.261 The primary purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule is to discourage police misconduct by removing the tempta-
tion to violate citizens' constitutional rights.262 The exclusionary rule 
lost a significant amount of its effectiveness as a deterrent after the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Leon. 263 In Leon, the 
Court adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and 
reasoned that officers should not be punished for executing war-
rants that they believe, in good faith, are valid.264 Prior to Kostelec, 
258. See id. The court quoted a portion of Article 27, section 551 (a) which specifi-
cally requires "that there is probable cause ... to believe that any misde-
meanor or felony is being committed . . . or that any property subject to 
seizure ... is situated or located ... in or on any such building." Id. 
259. Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163. 
260. See id. at 240, 703 A.2d at 165. 
261. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (excluding evidence that the ac-
cused was forced to give as a result of an unlawful seizure); see also WHITE-
BREAD & SLOBOGIN. supra note 33, at 17. 
262. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (observing that a pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct); United Statesv. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (observing that the exclusionary rule is de-
signed to protect Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect); see 
also David P. Mitchell, Anticipatary Search Warrants: The Supreme Court's Opportu-
nity to Reexamine the Framework of the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 
1396-98 (1991) (discussing the evolution of the exclusionary rule). 
263. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
264. See id. at 913; see also Mitchell, supra note 262, at 1396. 
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the Leon decision was closely tied to the issue of anticipatory war-
rants in Maryland. This tie is exemplified in both Cable and McDon-
ald, where the courts invoked the good faith exception when the 
warrant was found to be defective.265 
The court in Kostelec chose not to address the issue of whether 
the exclusionary rule was the proper remedy for a violation of Arti-
cle 27, section 551.266 However, it is doubtful that the court of ap-
peals would impose the exclusionary rule for violations of the stat-
ute. In previous Maryland decisions, the court has intimated that 
Article 27, section 551 contains no exclusionary remedy.267 
In re SPecial Investigation No. 228,268 provides a detailed analysis 
of Article 27, section 551 and its relation to the exclusionary rule.269 
The court in In re Special Investigation No. 228 explained that Article 
27, section 551 does not require a court to apply the exclusionary 
rule to remedy a violation of the statute.270 While the statute does 
provide that evidence seized should be returned to the rightful 
owner, it is silent on the issue of whether the evidence can be used 
in the government's case-ln-chief.271 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland again addressed the exclu-
sionary rule in conjunction with Article 27, section 551 in Chu v. 
Anne Arundel County.272 Here, the defendant argued that property 
taken from him. during an illegal search and seizure should not be 
included in an affidavit supporting a search warrant.273 While ac-
knowledging the existence of the exclusionary rule for Fourth 
Amendment violations, the court held that Chu was not entided to 
265. See supra notes 227-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Cable v. 
State, 65 Md. App. 493 (1985); see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451 (1948). 
266. See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 243, 703 A.2d 160, 166 (1997). 
267. See Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 686, 537 A.2d 250, 256 (1988) 
(noting that section 551 (a) does not contain an exclusionary rule); see also In 
re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 157-65, 458 A.2d 820, 824-28 
(1983) (contrasting the Fourth Amendment with section 551(a) of Article 27). 
268. 54 Md. App. 149, 458 A.2d 820 (1983). 
269. See id. at 159-77, 458 A.2d at 825-35. 
270. See id. at 166-68, 458 A.2d at 825-34. 
271. See id. at 166-67,458 A.2d at 829. Subsection (c) of the statute mandates that 
property rightfully taken must be returned after there is no further need for 
the retention of the property. See id. at 167, 458 A.2d at 829. This implies that 
it can be retained until after presentation of the prosecutor's case-in-chief. 
272. 311 Md. 673, 537 A.2d 250 (1988). 
273. See id. at 686, 537 A.2d at 251. 
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such a remedy under Article 27, section 551.274 
Much like the courts in In re Special Investigation No. 228 and 
Chu, the Kostelec court failed to find an exclusionary remedy in Arti-
cle 27, section 551.275 However, because the State failed to raise this 
issue in Kostelec's suppression hearing, the court refused to rule on 
the availability of the exclusionary rule to Kostelec's case.276 Thus, 
when addressing the issue of anticipatory warrants in Maryland, fu-
ture courts may still permit the use of the evidence obtained 
through such warrants even though they have been held to be in vi-
olation of the Maryland statute. 
C. Anticipatory Search Warrants: Their Future in Maryland 
Several state courts, including Florida, Colorado, and Alabama, 
have held that anticipatory warrants are inconsistent with their re-
spective state statutes and have indicated that the state statutes will 
have to be amended to achieve a different result.277 Through its 
holding that anticipatory search warrants are inconsistent with Mary-
land statutory law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has sent a 
clear message to the Maryland General Assembly that it is time to 
amend the law.278 In Kostelec, the court gave no definite implication 
as to how they would rule on the issue if anticipatory warrants were 
allowed by statute.279 However, the case law from a multitude of fed-
eral courts and states that have amended their statutes suggests that 
anticipatory warrants remain within the dictates of the Fourth 
Amendment. 280 
By disallowing anticipatory search warrants, Maryland courts de-
prive law enforcement agencies of a powerful tool to combat drug 
trafficking. Anticipatory search warrants aid law enforcement of-· 
ficers in their effort to combat drug traffickers, who easily move evi-
dence before officers can obtain traditional search warrants. With-
out this asset, which is readily available to law enforcement in most 
other jurisdictions in the nation,281 local law enforcement will likely 
lobby aggressively for an amendment to the current Maryland law. 
274. See id. at 680, 537 A.2d at 256. 
275. See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230, 240-42, 703 A.2d 160, 165-66 (1997). 
276. See id. 
277. See supra notes 173-211 and accompanying text. 
278. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 240, 703 A.2d at 165. 
279. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra notes 131-68 and accompanying text. 
281. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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Given today's anti-crime climate,282 it is likely that law-makers would 
likewise support an amendment to the statute, so as to bolster the 
effectiveness of law enforcement.283 
In February of 1998, Maryland House Bill 706 was introduced 
in the Maryland legislature calling for the repeal, amendment, and 
re-enactment of Article 27, section 551 of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland.284 Bill 706 proposed that Article 27, section 551 be 
amended to include the future tense language, "there is probable 
cause . . . to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being com-
mitted OR WILL BE COMMIITED."285 However, this Bill failed in 
the judiciary committee, and the law in Maryland remains un-
changed for now.286 
V. ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 
Even if Article 27, section 551(a) is amended to permit antici-
patory search warrants,287 these warrants may be challenged on con-
stitutional grounds. However, a majority of courts that have ad-
dressed the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants have concluded 
that they are consistent with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.288 Although no Maryland court has addressed the con-
stitutionality of anticipatory warrants,289 the girth of federal case law 
282. See Sara S. Beale, Whats Law Got to Do with It? The Politica~ Socia~ Psychological 
and Other Non-l£gal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23, 40-47 (detailing the political climate, the media's effect 
on the public's perception of crime, and explaining the history and reasoning 
underlying the public's current anti-crime attitude); Richard L. Burke, Crime is 
Becoming Nation s Top Fear: Poll Shows Economy Losing First Place as a Concern, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at Al (discussing the fact that Americans now view 
crime as the most important problem that society faces today). 
283. See Kenneth Jost, Exclusionary Rul£ Reforms Advance, 81 A.B.AJ., May 1995, at 18 
(discussing a move by the Republican majorities in Congress to pass legisla-
tion that would effectively abolish the exclusionary rule in federal courts be-
cause the rule favors criminals, and "We're losing convictions all around the 
country"). 
284. See H.B. 706 (Md. 1998). 
285. Id. at 2. 
286. See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1996 & Supp. 1998). The fact that the 
statute has remained unchanged to date leads to the conclusion that the bill 
was not accepted. 
287. In order for an anticipatory search warrant to be permitted in Maryland, the 
language of Article 27, section 551 (a) must be amended to include the future 
tense language-"will be committed." 
288. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
289. See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 230,236,703 A.2d 160, 162 (1997). Although an-
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indicates that future. constitutional challenges to these warrants may 
be decided by the Supreme Court. 
If the Supreme Court were to actually grant a writ of certiorari 
to address anticipatory search warrants, these would likely be up-
held. During the Warren Court era, the Supreme Court dramati-
cally expanded the defendant's federally protected constitutional 
rights.290 Since the end of the Warren Court, the Court's attitude to-
ward this issue has shifted dramatically. 29 I A prevalent theme of the 
post-Warren Courts is that "the ultimate mission of the criminal jus-
tice system is to convict the guilty and let the innocent go free. "292 
The decisions of the post-Warren Courts suggest that "the rights 
enumerated in the Constitution are not all entitled to the same de-
gree of judicial protection, but instead should be valued according 
to their impact on the adequacy of the guilt determining 
process. "293 
Post-Warren courts have considerably watered down the Fourth 
Amendment's ban on unreasonable search and seizure with their 
less than enthusiastic treatment of the exclusionary rule.294 Unlike 
the Warren Court, which preferred the adoption of specific rules to 
other ground of attack may be Article 26 of the Maryland Constitution, this 
will likely be a weak argument because this provision is interpreted in pari 
materia with the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 212 and accompanying 
text. 
290. In the early and mid-1960s, the Court began creating a wide variety of rules 
designed to provide those involved in the criminal justice system with ade-
quate protection from overreaching by the state. An example of this is Mapp 
v. Ohio, in which the Court held that any evidence seized in violation of the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be excluded from state and fed-
eral prosecution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961). 
291. President Nixon appointed Chief Justice Burger in 1969, Justice Blackmun in 
1970, and Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist in 1972. Rehnquist became 
Chief Justice in 1987. The appointment of Justice Rehnquist has been deemed 
to be the beginning of a conservative era for the Court. See Carol S. Steiker, 
Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two An-
swers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2468 (1996) ("[TJhe Court has clearly become 
less sympathetic to claims of individual rights and more accommodating of as-
sertions of the need for public order."); James F. Simon, Speech: Politics and the 
Rehnquist Court, 40 N.Y.L. Sm. L. REv. 863, 863-64 (1996) ("Rehnquist's con-
servative vision would severely limit the protections of civil rights litigants 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and civil rights statutes, and, in general, 
approve governmental authority at the expense of individual rights."). 
292. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 33, § 1.02, at 4. 
293. Id. 
294. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653-54. 
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guide law enforcement officers and courts, subsequent Courts have 
relied on a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determine 
probable cause.295 Although affording police and courts more flexi-
bility in evaluating probable cause, this approach has facilitated 
standardless police conduct. As a result of the Court's "totality of 
the circumstances" approach, there has been a relaxation of consti-
tutional restrictions on law enforcement.296 
Moreover, today's Court employs the "Crime Control Model" of 
criminal procedure, which places a premium on efficiency and 
quick adjudication of defendants.297 This model of criminal proce-
dure requires that any limitation placed on law enforcement offi-
cials should be solely out of a desire to promote the reliability of 
the outcome; purely technical controls on police behavior are in-
consistent with this model of the criminal process.298 Under this 
model, anticipatory search warrants are a "purely technical con-
trol;"299 the current Court would likely view these warrants as a 
merely technical restraint on police behavior, which would unneces-
sarily delay police in bringing the guilty to justice. Therefore, the 
current Court would likely endorse the use of anticipatory warrants 
by finding them to be valid under the Fourth Amendment. 
295. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) ("[The] totality of the circum-
stances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable 
cause than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every in-
formant's tip. H); if. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (explaining 
that the Court has moved away from a two step standing inquiry to the single 
question of "whether government officials violated any legitimate expectation 
of privacy"); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977) (recognizing 
that when addressing the constitutionality of extrajudicial identifications the 
test is whether the identification was reliable under a totality of the circum-
stances). 
296. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (permitting search of car's in-
terior when the occupant is arrested); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 235 (1973) (permitting a search incident to a lawful arrest for all crimes); 
see also Mitchell, supra note 33, at 1400-·07. 
297. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN. supra note 33, § 1.03, at 9 (discussing Herbert 
Packer's study of the criminal process in Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction, pt. II, ch. 8, at 149 (1968». 
298. See id. at 10. 
299. [d. 
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. VI. THE PROS AND CONS OF ANTICIPATORY SEARCH 
WARRANTS 
A. The Advantages of Anticipatory Warrants 
On closer examination, it becomes apparent that anticipatory 
warrants can provide significant advantages to law enforcement of-
ficers seeking to protect the public. Proponents of anticipatory war-
rants see them as a necessary weapon in the "War on DrugS."300 The 
evolution of the inner city drug trade includes ~n increased use of 
crack houses, from which dealers can distribute drugs quickly after 
delivery. This mobility indicates that law enforcement personnel 
should be able to rely on anticipatory warrants as a means to seize 
large drug shipments before they are moved.301 Proponents also 
claim that any dangers posed by anticipatory warrants can be con-
trolled by judges and magistrates who place strict guidelines on 
their use.302 The analytical breakdowns undertaken by the Garcid303 
and Gendron304 courts support this argument by creating the impres-
sion that judges and magistrates consider a strict set of criteria 
before issuing anticipatory warrants.305 
In the context of government agents intercepting illegal mate-
rial in the mail, anticipatory warrants also serve a useful purpose for 
law enforcement and society as a whole. For example, in the case of 
intercepted child pornography, merely destroying the contraband 
would only provide a short-term solution to a social pathology.306 On 
the other hand, an anticipatory warrant for the premises where the 
child pornography is to be delivered allows law enforcement to ar-
rest the subscriber and limit the child exploitation market at the 
same time.307 
Another valid argument presented by ·proponents of anticipa-
tory warrants is that without them, law enforcement will be left with 
the option to conduct warrantless searches under the guise of the 
exigent circumstances exception.3og \Vithout the protection of a 
300. See Powers, supra note 31, at 59. 
301. See ill. at 62. 
302. See id. at 63. 
303. For a discussion of Garcia, see supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text. 
304. For a discussion of Gendron, see supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text. 
305. See supra notes 76-86, 114-30 and accompanying text. 
306. See Adams, supra note 32, at 701-02. 
307. See id. 
308. See Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (asserting that "the need to 
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would 
be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency" (quoting Wayne v. 
376 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
sworn affidavit before a neutrally detached magistrate, the possibility 
of police misconduct increases.309 
B. The Dangers of Anticipatory Warrants 
The primary dangers associated with anticipatory search war-
rants are the power and discretion that they entrust to law enforce-
ment personnel. By relying on the prophetic testimony of police of-
ficers as to events that will occur in the future, courts no longer 
base the issuance of warrants on facts that exist, but rather are· per-
mitted to base warrants on facts that may exist in the future.3lO With 
the establishment of the good faith exception in Leon,311 it is even 
more dangerous when police inaccurately predict future events and 
execute searches based on their flawed predictions.312 
While anticipatory search warrants can be practical law enforce-
ment tools for combating the distribution of illegal narcotics and 
other contraband, they provide officials with ample opportunity to 
abuse their discretion. Originally, the "on a sure course" require-
ment provided a guarantee that a package containing contraband 
had an established destination and law enforcement could obtain 
warrants in anticipation of the delivery of the package to that ad-
dress.313 Yet, subsequent applications of the "on a sure course" test 
have diluted the strict criteria for the issuance of anticipatory war-
rants.314 The Garcia decision went even further to shy away from 
strict adherence to the "on a sure course" test by applying a list of 
criteria that reflects a "totality of the circumstances" motif.315 With-
out the strict application of the "on a sure course" test, law enforce-
United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963»); Warden, Maryland Peni-
tentiary v. Harden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (indicating that the Fourth 
Amendment will not impede an investigation when doing so would endanger 
lives); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982) (allowing a 
warrantless search based on the exigency of locating explosive materials used 
to produce methamphetamine); WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 33, § 
9.01-04, at 202-08 (discussing the parameters of the evanescent evidence ex-
ception to the warrant requirement); Messina, supra note 6, at 408. 
309. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948). 
310. See Messina, supra note 6, at 407-08 (discussing the dangers of anticipatory 
warrants). 
311. For a discussion of Leon, see supra notes 263-265 and accompanying text. 
312. For a discussion of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see 
supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text. 
314. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text. 
315. For a discussion of Garcia, see supra notes 114-30 and accompanying text. 
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ment personnel now have the opportunity to manipulate a pack-
age's final destination, thereby enhancing the possibility of abuse. 
This danger was clearly illustrated in Kostelec. 316 Here, police ar-
rested a man after he left his home with a package that the police 
knew to contain PCP.317 Mter police arrested the man, they relied 
on his statements to obtain an anticipatory search warrant for the 
home of Kostelec.318 Although the package was not addressed to 
Kostelec, the police arranged to have it delivered to his home.319 
Without the information supplied by the individual who had been 
arrested for possession of narcotics, the police would have been un-
able to determine that Kostelec's home was the package's final desti-
nation. This factual scenario suggests that police have the ability to 
orchestrate the delivery of a package to any address and, more im-
portantly, to obtain a search warrant for that address in anticipation 
of its delivery. Although the court in Kostelec never addressed the 
"on a sure course" issue, the facts are not completely different from 
those in Garcia, where a federal court upheld a search pursuant to 
an anticipatory warrant even though there was no "sure course" for 
the contraband.320 
In addition to the possible abuse of police discretion that can 
accompany the use of anticipatory search warrants, revisions of the 
standards for determining probable cause present a precarious pro-
position. Due to the Supreme Court's abandonment of clear criteria 
for probable cause determinations,321 what seems legally permissible 
under the "totality of the circumstances" rubric can lead down a 
slippery slope away from adherence to the fundamental principles 
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The use of anticipatory search warrants has been widely ac-
cepted by both federal and state courts.322 State courts that have 
suppressed evidence gathered pursuant to anticipatory warrants 
have done so solely because they contradicted the requirements for 
valid search warrants in state statutes.323 Kostelec forced Maryland 
316. For a discussion of Kostelec, see supra notes 246-60 and accompanying text. 
317. See Kostelec v. State, 348 Md. 209, 232-33, 703 A.2d 160, 161 (1997). 
318. See id. at 233, 703 A.2d at 161. 
319. See id. at 232-33, 703 A.2d at 161. 
320. See supra notes 114-130 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra Section V. 
322. See supra Sections II., III.A. 
323. See supra Section III.B. 
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courts to confront whether anticipatory search warrants were valid 
under state law and have consequently brought about a temporary 
end to their use.324 
Although anticipatory search warrants have been held to be in-
consistent under current law,325 this does not mean that Maryland 
has forever bid farewell to the use of such warrants. Anticipatory 
search warrants provide a valuable tool for law enforcement in their 
efforts to combat drug trlUfickers who can easily move the evidence 
of their crimes before police officers are able to obtain traditional 
search warrants.326 
If the law in Maryland were amended to allow for the use of 
anticipatory search warrants, the validity of such warrants could only 
be attacked on Fourth Amendment grounds.327 The Supreme Court 
has yet to grant certiorari on the issue of anticipatory search war-
rants; judging from the Court's current conservative posture, it is 
likely that anticipatory warrants would be held constitutionaP28 
Yet, there is a strong temptation for law enforcement officials 
to abuse anticipatory warrants.329 The ability of officials to obtain 
search warrants for locations that they contend will contain evi-
dence of a crime sometime in the future creates the possibility of 
police error and misconduct.33o As seen in Kostelec, police can ma-
nipulate where illegal materials are delivered and then obtain war-
. rants for that location.331 If anticipatory search warrants are permit-
ted in Maryland in the future, it is essential that their use be 
governed by strict guidelines and procedures to prevent a further 
erosion of the rights of Maryland citizens.332 
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324. See supra notes 246-60 and accompanying text. 
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326. See supra Section IV.A. 
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